Security and the rep's mailbox
What Opptain reads, what it keeps, and what leaves the machine. Written 4 October 2026 for a security review; where the record lives added 5 October.
This describes a prototype. Everything above the last section is what the software does today. The last section is what does not exist yet, and a security team should treat those items as open.
Where the record lives
It depends on how the rep reaches Opptain. On Claude Desktop the record is a file on the rep's own machine, and everything below about "the rep's own machine" is literally that. In ChatGPT, or Claude on the web, an assistant cannot reach a laptop, so the record is held on Opptain's server (Google Cloud, United States): one record per rep, opened only with that rep's key, which the server holds encrypted under the rep's own sign-in token. There, read "the rep's own file" below as that record. Either way, mail is read only through the rep's own connection, and the server never holds a mail, CRM or call-recorder credential.
What it reads, and whose access it uses
Opptain has no mailbox of its own and no service account. It reads mail through the rep's own mail connection, under the rep's own credentials, on the rep's own machine, and only while the rep has it open. There is no central inbox, no shared credential and no background job: nothing is read when the rep is not there.
It searches, rather than syncing. A sweep runs a search against one account's correspondence — for example, threads with that customer since a given date — and reads what comes back. It does not copy the mailbox.
What it keeps
Two things are written, both in the rep's own file on their own machine:
| What is stored | Contents |
|---|---|
| A record of the sweep | When it ran, which account, the time window searched, the search terms used, how many threads came back, which mailbox. No message content. |
| One row per thread it used | Subject, time of the last message, how many messages, and a short note of what the thread established about the deal — which can quote what the customer wrote, with who wrote it. |
Message bodies, attachments and recipient lists are not stored. The schema carries the rule in the file itself: the raw correspondence never leaves the machine; only the note does.
A rep can remove any of it — a thread, a contact, an account — with a reason recorded, so the deletion itself is answerable. Nothing is removed silently.
What leaves the machine
Three destinations, and mail is in none of them:
- Salesforce: only fields the rep has confirmed in that session. Drafts write nothing on their own.
- The company layer, which is what a manager reads: patterns and lessons with no customer or person in them, the rep's own committed number, and asks the rep chooses to send — on a fixed allow-list of fields. A manager's screen cannot read a rep's file at all; this is enforced in the design, not by permission settings.
- Nowhere else. There is no vendor telemetry, no analytics service and no second copy of the record.
Put plainly: a manager cannot see a rep's mail, the notes taken from it, or which threads exist. They see what the rep sent them.
What a rep sees about their own mail
The screens say when a sweep found nothing — that absence is often the finding, as in the deal where no correspondence existed at all, which is how the product knew the buyer's review had not started. The rep is told what was searched and when, so the search is repeatable and arguable.
What does not exist yet, and should before any pilot
None of the following is built:
- An administrator control. There is no org-level policy to turn mail reading off, scope it to named accounts, or set a retention period. Today it is the rep's own connection and the rep's own file.
- Automatic retention limits. Notes stay in the rep's file until the rep removes them or the file is deleted.
- An export for an investigation, and an audit trail a security team can read directly rather than through the product.
- Encryption at rest beyond whatever the machine's own disk encryption provides.
- A data processing agreement, a sub-processor list, and a legal basis assessment for the EU — including works-council consultation where a works council exists. No German or EU deployment should be attempted before that work is done.
- Any answer about mail in regulated-industry supervision regimes, where correspondence may be subject to its own retention and surveillance rules.
The honest summary
Architecturally this is the gentlest version of the capability: the rep's own access, no central store, notes rather than copies, and no path from a manager to a rep's correspondence. What is missing is the administrative layer a company needs in order to prove any of that — controls, retention, audit and the paperwork. That is build work, not a redesign.